KANDAHAR, Afghanistan - He reportedly makes no apologies for killing his "enemies" on sight and has been instrumental in NATO's attempt this fall to pacify Kandahar one brutal step at a time.

There are those in Afghanistan who have labelled Col. Abdul Razik a "butcher" in the past, and some have accused him of profiting from the burgeoning illegal drug trade.

Yet others in the provincial government and western armies hail him as a hero who is helping to bring stability to a troubled land, with a series of lightning-style raids deep in Taliban enclaves.

There is no doubt the prominent Achakzai border police commander's influence has been significant in wrestling key pieces of the province away from insurgent influence.

It began with a raid in Mehlajat, on the outskirts of the provincial capital last summer, but Razik's operations have taken on a life of their own.

He has been all over the war-wasted province this fall to the enthusiastic applause of American commanders who regard him as "tremendously respected among the Afghans" and "a great partner" for NATO.

Knowing his history, Canadian officers are more circumspect.

"He's been extremely effective," Brig.-Gen. Dean Milner, the commander of Canadian troops, said in a recent interview. "I think you always have a few concerns because he's had some challenges in the past."

Over the last five weeks, The Canadian Press has conducted dozens of interviews with Afghan officials, ordinary citizens and military commanders about this shadowy proxy war within the war.

The raids conducted by Razik and up to 400 hand-picked fighters, alongside U.S. Special Forces soldiers, are playing with ethnic fire, according to some Afghan officials, who -- despite giving the raids their approval -- worry about the potential fallout.

The attacks fuel suspicion and threaten to re-ignite the hatred that four years ago layered a bloody tribal war on top of an already violent insurgency in western Kandahar.

Since the raid into Mehjalat in late August, Razik's militia has acted as a roving disruption force for NATO, striking at hardened Taliban redoubts such as Zangabad, Bandi Taimoor in far-flung Maiwand district and pockets of Arghandab district.

There is little warning, even for allies.

Canadian ground commanders in Panjwaii had no idea he was coming into their sector in October until his convoy of heavily armed fighters "tripped one of the spike belts" along a newly constructed east-west road in the district, according to a senior military source.

Razik's mission was to hunt down and kill senior Taliban commanders as well as known bomb-making cells. He went in ahead of American and later Canadian troops in the Horn of Panjwaii.

A farm owner in Zangabad, Haji Noor Muhammad, said the militia force gunned down an insurgent who wasn't from the area.

"He was an Afghan from another province," Muhammad said in an interview, with the help of an interpreter. "As long as he doesn't kill anybody from Zangabad there is no problem."

Fear that Razik's operations could rekindle a tribal war between Razik's Achakzai militia and the Noorzai, the dominant tribe in southern Afghanistan, are never far from the surface.

"It depends on the activities (of) Mr. Razik," said Haji Agha Lalai, who ran a re-integration for Taliban fighters in Kandahar city.

"If he acts positively then the war will not start between (tribes). If he uses harsh words and shows that he's targetting (Noorzai) instead of anti-government forces, then it will start again."

Canadians have watched the developments with an uneasy eye.

Many of them remember all too well the late summer of 2006, when frustrated provincial council members gave Razik the green light to lead his Achakzai militia into Panjwaii to counter a growing buildup of Taliban fighters. That was before Operation Medusa routed up to 1,000 insurgent fighters.

What is little understood about the Afghan war is that the Taliban are largely supported by the powerful Noorzai tribe, rivals to the Achakzai.

The hatred runs deep because, during the reign of the Taliban, the Achakzai were slaughtered and many fled to Pakistan until the U.S. ousted the hard-line Islamist movement in 2001.

Razik's father was killed, while his uncle was hanged from the barrel of a Taliban tank, according to a Kandahar provincial councillor.

As he led his militia into Panjwaii in 2006, the then 28-year-old was believed to have a score to settle and word spread among the rival tribesmen that Razik was out for Noorzai blood. His raid turned in to a fiasco, with dozens killed, when the force was ambushed at the district centre outside of Bazaar-e-Panjwaii.

"This was a bad idea to bring in Abdul Razik," Haji Qassum, a provincial council member, told the Globe and Mail in 2006. "One village had 10 or 20 fighters against the government, and the next day maybe 200."

Today, district officials like Panjwaii governor Haji Baran sing a different tune.

"Razik is my brother," said Baran, an elder of Noorzai blood. "Concern about him is only what we see in the media."

After the 2006 gunfight in Bazaar-e-Panjwaii, the Canadians were happy to see Razik retreat to the border region, where he was given the title of border police commander and largely left alone to grow wealthy, thanks to his control of the porous Spin Boldak crossing.

His rehabilitation as a military commander began in 2009 when the U.S. 5th Stryker Brigade took over the Canadian forward operating base in the district. American Lt.-Col. William Clark, commander of the brigade's 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, cultivated a friendship with Razik.

But it wasn't until the murder of a police chief in Daman district last summer that Razik was fully unleashed on the Taliban.

The New York Times reported that a furious Ahmed Wali Karzai complained to his brother, Afghan president Hamid Karzai, who in turned invested provincial governor Tooryalai Wesa with the powers of a commander-in-chief.

They turned to Razik to lead a 1,700-man force in Mehlajat.

Milner said it's understood by everyone that the militia leader is a polarizing figure among Kandaharis.

"He understands, he can only do so much, but the bottom line is the people are very supportive of his actions," said Milner.

Milner said people have to be careful about how much they make use of Razik. "I think Gov. Wesa understands that. You can lean on him only so much."

That may be an understatement.

When asked what sort of rules of engagement apply to Razik, NATO officials responded that he fights the Afghan way. Even a generous interpretation of that means there are few restrictions on what he and his men can shoot at.

There is also a political embarrassment in the making.

Training competent Afghan security forces is supposed to be the alliance's primary goal, yet the provincial administration is compelled to turn to a militia leader to carry out its counter-terrorism operations.